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1. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the earliest work about game theory was introduced and was 
investigated by von Neumann and Morgenstern [9]. Both individual 
stability and collective stability have been studied in practical game 
problems. In view of individual stability innoncooperative n-person games, 
the concept of equilibrium point was introduced by Nash [8]. The concept 
is an extended one of saddle point in two-person zero-sum games. Such the 
equilibrium points have been investigated by many authors. 
In [l-2], the Nash theorem for the existence of noncooperative 
equilibrium point is proved by means of the Ky Fan fixed point theorem 
and some selection theorems for fixed points [&7]. But, in order to prove 
the Nash theorem, we need to assume the stronger condition such that a 
strategy set for each player is compact. So, we want to weaken the 
compactness condition. In this paper, we describe a noncooperative 
n-person game in strategic form (or normal form) and.give a definition f
s-equilibrium point. Excluding the compactness condition of the strategy 
set for each player, we shall study the characterization of s-equilibrium 
point in the n-person game. Then, Ekeland’s theorem will play an important 
role [4-51. 
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This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we formulate 
a noncooperative n-person game and define &-equilibrium point. Section 3 
is the main part of this paper. Associated with the results of [l], we give 
the characterization of &-equilibrium point in the game. Especially, using 
the results of Borwein [3], we replace the compactness condition by the 
closedness condition in Theorem 3.8. 
2. FORMULATION OF A NONCOOPERATIVE ~-PERSON GAME 
We define a noncooperative n-person game by the following strategic 
form 
(N, X F), (2.1) 
where 
(i) N = (1, 2, . . . . n) is the set of n players. 
(ii) X= fly=, X’ c U = n;=, IL/‘, for each iE N, Xi is the subset of a 
Banach space U’ and is called the strategy set of each player i. 
(iii) F= (f’, f2, . . . . f”): X+ R”, is a multiloss operator and, for each 
i E N, fi : X + R, denotes a loss function for player i. 
In this paper, denoting by i= N - i the coalition adverse to each player 
i, the multistrategy set, X= nr= 1 Xi is split as follows 
‘y=X’xX’ and xi=flxj. 
i#z 
If xi and ni denote the projection from X into X’ and Xi, we set xi= nix 
and xi = xix for a multistrategy x = (xi, xi) E X. 
Now, we define, for each iE N, 
d = -2: j-i(x) 
and, throughout this paper, we assume that CC’ > - 00 for all i E N. In this 
case, the game is bounded below and cc = (IX’, c?, . . . . CY”) is called shadow 
minimum of the game. Then, we have 
F(X)ca+R”,, 
where 
F(X) = {F(x) E R”; for all x = (x’, .x2, ... . x”) E X} 
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and 
R”+ = {x = (x’, x2, . . . . x”)ER”;x’>O for all HEN}. 
If 0: = F(x) belongs to F(X), the multistrategy X EX attains to the minimum 
of the loss function fi for each player i. In this case, x is the best solution 
for each player. But, this situation is seldom the case and we have 
to investigate other solution concepts. So, we consider especially 
noncooperative equilibrium point. 
DEFINITION 2.1. A multistrategy x=(x’, x2, . . . . x’l) EX is said to be 
a-equilibrium point if, for some E > 0 and all i E N, 
f’(x) B ,.j$;,=ytf’(y)+E. (2.2) 
Remark 2.1. If E = 0 in Definition 2.1, the &-equilibrium point x is 
called noncooperative quilibrium point or Nash equilibrium point and, 
given the complementary coalition’s choice xi, player i responds by playing 
a strategy xi E X’ which minimizes ,f’( ., xi) on Xi, that is 
f’(x’, xi) = ,,.xl'::,= <<.f'(J+ (2.3) 
Remark 2.2. If N= { 1, 2} and f’(x) + f ‘(x) = 0 for all multistrategies 
x E X = X1 x X2, e-equilibrium point is called s-saddle point in the two-person 
zero-sum game. 
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF E-EQUILIBRIUM POINT IN THE ~-PERSON GAME 
In order to show the characterization of s-equilibrium point in the game, 
we introduce the function cp: Xx X+ R, defined by 
dx, Y)’ i L-fib)-fi(yi,xi)]. 
,=I 
THEOREM 3.1. Suppose that, for some E > 0 and a multistrategy .?E X, 
cp satisfies 
sup cp(X, y) < &. 
L.EX 
(3.1) 
Then, X is an E-equilibrium point. 
Proof Let X = (Xl, X2, . . . . X”) E X be the multistrategy satisfying (3.1). 
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We set y = (y’, 2;). Then, we have rc’y = X’ for all j# i and n’y = yi. It 
follows from (3.1) that 
qP(x, y) =f’(x) -f’(y) GE. 
Therefore, we obtain 
.P(-f) 6 yth;,=xifi(Y)+&. (3.2) 
Thus, (3.2) is true for each in N, which proves the result. 
Remark 3.1. We assume that, for each iE N, the strategy set Xi is a 
convex compact subset and the loss function fi is continuous and fi( ., xi) 
is convex for all X’E X! Then, using the Ky Fan theorem, we can show that 
there exists a multistrategy X EX satisfying (3.1) with E = 0. In this case, the 
multistrategy X is a Nash equilibrium point. 
THEOREM 3.2. Suppose that X is an &-equilibrium point. For all multi- 
strategies y E X, 
d-f, y)dnc. 
ProoJ: From the definition fs-equilibrium point, it follows that, for all 
ic N and all yi~Xi, 
y(x) -fi( yi, 2) 6 E. 
Adding the above inequalities, we obtain 
CPG, Y) G n.2 for all yE:X. 
Thus, the proof is completed. 
Now, we introduce the conjugate function defined by 
fi*(pi; xi) = sup [(Pi, Yi> -.f’(Y’? xi)l for all pi E U’*, 
ysu,n~y=.d 
where U’* denotes the dual space of the Banach space U’. Then, the 
conjugate function is lower semi-continuous convex function with respect 
to pi. See [l, p. 61, Sect. 2.41. 
DEFINITION 3.1. For some E 2 0, f ‘*( .; xi): U’* --) R, is called s-sub- 
differentiable at p E U’* if there is x’** E U’** such that 
fi*(p;x’)--f’*(p;x’)~(x’**,p-p)-& forall pEU’* 
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and this xi ** . IS called an e-subgradient offi*( .; xi) at p. The set of all 
subgradients is called s-subdifferential of fi*( .; xi) at p E U’* and is 
denoted by 8,fi*(p; xi). 
Remark 3.2. The e-subdifferential 8,fi*(p; xi) is a point-to-set mapping 
from U’* into 2”‘*’ and it may be empty if fi* is not .s-subdifferentiable. 
If E = 0 in the definition, a fi *(p ; xi) is said to be subdifferential of 
f’*( .; xi) at p. 
THEOREM 3.3. lf x = (2, X2, . . . . 9’) is E-equilibrium point when X= U, 
then for each i E N, 
X’E a,f’*(o; 2’). (3.3) 
Proof. Let 
j?*(c); jp)= - Ilt &;,=i;fi(Yi3 Xi) 
(by the definition fthe conjugate function) 
d -f’(R) + E (X is s-equilibrium point) 
< (O- pi, Xi) +f’*(p;; 2-i) + E. (3.4) 
Thus, it follows from (3.4) that 
X’E a,f’*(o; 2). 
This completes the proof. 
THEOREM 3.4. Suppose that, for a multistrategy X EX and all i E N, the 
loss function fi( ., Xi) is lower semi-continuous convex function on ii’ and 
XiEi?Ji*(O; Xi). (3.5) 
Then, this X E X is an s-equilibrium point. 
ProoJ From (3.5), it follows that, for all ie N and all p;~ U’* 
fi*(p;; Xi) -fi*( O;X’)> (2, Pi)--&, 
that is, 
E -f’*(o; Xi) >/ (2, p;) -fi*(p;; 3’). (3.6) 
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Since for all i E N, each loss function fi( ., Xi) is lower semi-continuous and 
convex, (3.6) shows that, for all iE N, 
E+ inf 
ye r/,i,rr’y=f’ 
ficyi, xi)>fi**(xi; jjf) 
(f ’ * * is the conjugate function off’*) 
= j”‘(Z), 
which completes the proof. 
Now, in order to study the relations between s-equilibrium points and 
differentiability of he loss function for each player i, we at first give the 
following definition. 
DEFINITION 3.2. For any X’E Vi, the loss function fi( ., xi) is said to be 
Gateaux-differentiable if at every point xi~ U’ there is a continuous linear 
functional Difi(xi, X~)E U’* such that, for any y’~ Vi, 
,l)f+ f [f’(x’+ tyi, xi) -f’(x’, xi)] = (Difi(Xi, xi), y’). 
THEOREM 3.5. Let the strategy set Xi for each player be closed subset in 
U’. We assume a multistrategy X = (X’, .%2, . .. . .j?‘) E int X is e-equilibrium 
point with E > 0 and, for each ie N, fi( ., Xi) is lower semi-continuous and 
Gateaux-differentiable on U’. Then, there exists 2 = (.E’, Z2, . . . . 2”) E X such 
that 
Il5z-Xll Qn& (3.7) 
and 
IlD,J“(?,X')II,<& for each ieN, (3.8) 
where int X denotes the set of all interior points of X and [I./I * denotes the 
norm in the dual space U’*. 
Proof: From the condition, the loss function fi( ., Xi) is lower semi- 
continuous on Ui. The game is bounded from below and X is s-equilibrium 
point, that is, 
Then, applying Ekeland’s theorem (see Appendix) to f i( ., Xi), there exists 
a point .??‘E Xi such that 
III’-X’JJ < E, (3.9) 
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and 
f’(y’, XQf;(?, 2)-& l)yi-.q for all y’~ X’. (3.10) 
Take any U’ E U’ and set y’= J? + TV’ in (3.10), with sufficiently small t > 0. 
This holds 
f [f’(.P + tu’, 2) -f’(l’, Xi)] 2 -& /(uil(. 
Letting t-+ 0 in the above inequality, we obtain 
(D;f’(?, Xi), u’) > -& lluill. (3.11) 
Taking the inhmum of both sides of (3.11) over all ui~ U’ with /(ui(/ = 1, we 
obtain 
- lIDifi(l’, Xi)11 * >, -& 
Thus, the proof is completed. 
Remark 3.3. By a similar argument to Theorem 3.5, it is well known 
that llDjfi(# * = 0 for a Nash equilibrium point .? E int A’. 
We can show the following theorem similar to [4, Proposition 121 when 
we do not assume loss function of each player, fi itself tobe differentiable. 
THEOREM 3.6. Let a multistrategy X be Nash equilibrium point when X is 
closed and X E int X. Assume that, for every E > 0, there exists a lower semi- 
continuous and GBteaux-differentiable function ,f L( ., Xi) such that 
f;(y’,x’)<f’(y’,x’) for all y’ E X’, (3.12) 
inf f L( y’, Xi) 2 inf f i( y’, Xi) - E, 
“’ Ex ’ y’ Ex1- 
(3.13) 
and 
Di f E( y’, Xi) + @(X) as E + 0 and y’+ 2’. (3.14) 
Then, for each i E N, 
@‘(X)=0 in U’*. 
Proof. Since X is Nash equilibrium point on X, for each iE N, X’ 
minimizes f i( ., Xi) on X’. So, it follows from (3.12) and (3.13) that 
f i(X) Q inf f i( y, Xi) + E. 
.\.I c X’ 
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From Ekeland’s theorem, it follows that there exists U: E Xi such that 
and uLEX’ minimizes F,( ., Xi) =ff( ., Xi) + & 11~: - . I( on Xi. Now, 
fi(., 2’) is differentiable at of and the function yi + 11~: - #(I, although not 
differentiable at uE, has a directional derivative inevery direction. Itfollows 
easily that of have to satisfy the condition 
0~D,f;(u~,?)+&B* (3.15) 
with B* the unit ball of U’*. Letting E + 0, of: converges to X’ and the 
left-hand side of (3.‘15) converges to @(X) because of (3.14). This proves 
the result. 
THEOREM 3.7. Suppose that, for each i E N, f i( ., Xi) is convex on U’ and 
IlDifWll z+z d 8. (3.16) 
Then, for each i E N, 
f’(Z) <f i(y’, Xi) + & (1 y’- X’(( for all y’E Ui. 
Proof Since f i( ., Xi) is convex on U’ and Gsteaux-differentiable, we 
have for all #E Vi, 
fi(y’, Zi) 2 f i(Z) + (Di f i(X), y’- Xi). 
It follows from (3.16) and (3.17) that 
fi(yi,Xi)>fi(X)-jlDifi(i)jl, ))y’-Xi11 
>f’(Z)-&l/y’-xi/J, 
(3.17) 
which completes the proof of the theorem. 
THEOREM 3.8. Suppose that, for each i E N, the strategy set X’ = U’ is 
reflexive, X = (X’, X2, . . . . 2”) is &-equilibrium point with E > 0, and the loss 
function f i( ., Xi) is lower semi-continuous convex on Vi. Then, there 
exists a point .?.E = (2:) Zf, . . . . 2:) E X and 2: = (2: *, Xz*, . . . . a:*) E U* = 
nrzt= u’* such that for each ic N, 
IlJ+X’II <& (3.18) 
lIz::*lI* <JE. (3.19) 
Further, 2, is a Nash equilibrium point of the game (N, X, F), where 
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F= (f’, p, . ..) f”) . 1s a multiloss operator and, when the players choose 
x = (xl, x2, . ..) x”) E X, f’(x) =f’(x’, Xi) - (.Zf*, xi) denotes a loss for each 
player i. 
Proof. Since X E X is an s-equilibrium point, it follows from Theorem 3.3 
that, for each i E N, 
X’E a,f’*(o; ii). (3.20) 
We set 
g’(pi, Xi) =fi*(p;; Xi) - (p,. 2) 
Then, g’(p,, Xi) is lower semi-continuous convex function with respect o p, 
because the conjugate function f’*( .; Xi) is lower semi-continuous and 
convex on U’*. From (3.20), we easily obtain 
g’(0, Xi) Q-d* g’(pj, 2’) + C. (3.21) 
So, g’(p,, Xi) is bounded from below on U’*. Applying Ekeland’s theorem 
to g’, it follows that there exists a point K,!,* E U’* such that, for all 
pi#T:*, 
g’(pi, Xi) > gqa;*, ii,-& /Ip,--P;*/I* (3.22) 
and 
gig *, Xi) 6 g’(0, Xi) - & jja;* 1)*, (3.23) 
where 
the function G( ., xi) = gi( ., xi) + 
so that Z:,* satisfies the following condition 
0 E a( g’($ *, Xi) + & h’(l; *, z’)), (3.24) 
Using the subdifferential sum formula, (3.24) can be written as 
OEafi*($*; 2’) -Xi + & B* 
with B* the unit ball in U’*. So, since U’ is reflexive, there exists 
2:~ U’** = U’ such that 
~;E~fi*(a:*;~i) (3.25) 
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and 
(3.26) 
From (3.26), we obtain 
llZ-::-.fill q/G llpz*ll QJi 
which shows that (3.18) in the theorem holds. Further, from (3.21) and 
(3.23) it follows easily that 
lI%“/l* <A. 
Thus, (3.19) in the theorem holds. 
In order to show that K, is a Nash equilibrium point of the game 
(ZV, X, F);), from (3.25) we obtain 
Si*(Pi;Xi)-fi*(~~*;Xi)~ ($ pi-g*) for all piE Ui*, 
that is, for all pi E U’*, 
-fi*(zz*; x')~(~~,Pi)-f'*(Pi;x')-(~~,~:E*). (3 27) 
Using the definition fthe conjugate function to (3.27), it follows that 
-sup [(ad*,~')-f~(y',x')]3f'**(~~;x')-(~~,~~*). (3.28) 
Y’E cl’ 
Since f i( ., xi) is lower semi-continuous and convex on U’, from (3.28), we 
obtain 
inf [f'(Y',Xi)-(~d*,Yi)]~fi(l~,xi)-(k~*,l::). y' EU' 
that is, 
.“~~~~~=iif’(~)=f’(~,). 
3 e 
Thus, the proof of the theorem is completed. 
Remark 3.4. Since the loss function f i( ., X’) for each player in 
Theorem 3.8 is convex on U’, f ‘( ., Xi) is Lipschitz on U’ except in 
parthological cases by the results of Roberts and Varberg [lo]. So, in 
usual cases, we easily obtain 
If'(i)-f'(Q < If+?, xi)-fqq, X')l + I($*, ?;)I 
< llX'-.q M+ 111:*11* II-f;ll, 
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where M denotes a real number, but it may depend on Xi E Xi. Applying 
(3.18) and (3.19) to the above inequality, itfollows that the loss f’(-g,) 
approximates fi(x) for suffkiently small E > 0. Consequently, the theorem 
says that if the game (IV, X, F) has an E-equilibrium point, there exists a
perturbed game (IV, X, F) which has a Nash equilibrium point and the 
points of both these games are close to each other. 
APPENDIX: EKELAND'S THEOREM [4-51 
Let (17, d) be a complete metric space, and f: U 4 R u ( + co ) a 1.~. 
function, f: +co, bounded from below. Let E > 0 be given, and a point 
u E U such that 
f(u)<inff+s. 
u 
Then there exists ome point II E U such that f(r) 6f( u), d(u, II) Q & and 
f(w)m4-Ja~, w) for all w E U. 
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